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This report presents the results of a number of simulations with the Social Policy 
Simulation Database and Model (SPSD/M) of National Child Benefit (NCB) rules, 
isolating the impact of these rules on low-income or poverty rates and gaps in Canada. 
According to the after-tax LICO, now the most widely reported measure of low income 
or poverty, the national poverty rate for economic families with children – after the 
provincial clawback of the NCB supplement (NCBS) from social assistance recipients 
and the provincial re-investment in cash or income-support programs (excluding in-kind 
programs) are factored in – fell 4.6 per cent between 1996 and 1999 because of the 
introduction of the NCBS. The drop in the poverty gap was even greater: 8.7 per cent.  
Under the rules set to be in place by 2004, the decline in the after-tax LICO poverty rate 
is projected to be 11.8 per cent and that in the poverty gap 18.0 per cent relative to the 
rate and gap that would have prevailed in the pre-NCBS world. The improvement in the 
economic well-being of low-income families with children would be even larger if the 
impact of provincial in-kind programs financed by the NCBS through the social 
assistance clawback were included.  4
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  On July 1, 1998, the federal, provincial (excluding Quebec), and territorial 
governments introduced the National Child Benefit, which provided a supplement to the 
basic child benefit to Canadian families with low incomes. One of the goals of this 
initiative was to reduce the depth of poverty suffered by children in Canada. The 
objective of this report is to evaluate the impact of this program on the low-income status 
of families with children in Canada. This report presents the results of a number of 
simulations run by Statistics Canada for the Centre for the Study of Living Standards 
(CSLS) with the Social Policy Simulation Database and Model (SPSD/M) on different 
child benefit regimes, isolating the impact of these rules on low-income rates and gaps. 
 
  The report is divided into six parts. Section one examines trends in child poverty 
in Canada in the 1990s. Section two discusses the motivation and nature of the National 
Child Benefit. Section three outlines the 14 scenarios that have been developed for the 
purposes of the impact analysis. Section four analyzes the impact of the introduction of 
the National Child Benefit Supplement (NCBS) under 1999 and 2004 rules for three 
measures of the low-income or poverty rate and gap for all economic families with 
children and separately for single-parent and two-parent families. The fifth section 
summarizes the main findings and the final section concludes. 
 
The main findings on the impact of the NCBS on poverty in Canada are 
highlighted below. 
 
•   The impact of the changes in the child benefits, primarily the establishment of the  
NCBS, on the low-income or poverty rate, expressed in terms of percentage points, is 
quite consistent across the three measures of low income. The difference between the 
scenarios based on 1996 and 1999 rules (including clawback and reinvestmemt) 
ranges from -0.6 to -0.8 points and between the scenarios based on 1996 and 2004 
rules from -1.3 to -1.8 points. In per cent terms, the impact is inversely proportional 
to the level of the poverty or low-income rate. It is highest for the after-tax LIM, 
which has the lowest poverty rate, and lowest for the before-tax LICO, which has the 
highest poverty rate. 
  
•   The impact of the NCBS on the low-income gap is always greater than on the low-
income rate, expressed in percentage terms.  
 
•   In terms of the overall effect of the NCBS relative to the 1996 base, around one half 
of the impact on the low-income rate and gap is realized by 1999, with the other half 
to be realized between 1999 and 2004. 
  5
•   The impact of the NCBS in terms of the per cent change in the poverty rate and 
poverty gap appears to be somewhat greater for two-parent families than for single-
parent families, reflecting the lower poverty levels for this family type. 
 
  The policy objectives of the NCBS include both the reduction in the poverty rate 
of families with children in Canada and, more importantly, the decrease in the depth of 
poverty for these families. The results of the simulations thus suggest that such a 
reduction was achieved by 1999, and will be even greater by 2004.  
 
According to the after-tax LICO, now the most widely reported measure of low 
income or poverty, the national poverty rate for economic families with children – after 
the provincial clawback of NCBS from social assistance recipients and the provincial re-
investment in cash or income-support programs (excluding in-kind programs) are 
factored in – fell 4.6 per cent between 1996 and 1999 because of the introduction of the 
NCBS. The drop in the poverty gap was even greater: 8.7 per cent.  
 
Under the rules set to be in place by 2004, the after-tax LICO rate is projected to 
fall 11.8 per cent and the poverty gap 18.0 per cent relative to the rates and gap that 
would have prevailed in the pre-NCBS world. The improvement in the economic well-
being of low-income families with children would be even larger if the impact of 
provincial in-kind programs financed by the NCBS through the social assistance 
clawback were included. 
 
Given the amount of resources devoted to the NCBS, these declines in the poverty 
rate and gap for families with children are not surprising. Indeed, they would have been 
even greater if a larger portion of NCBS funds went to the poor, although the reasons this 
is not the case – the use of net income and the income of only the two parents (excluding 
the income of other family member) for NCBS eligibility– are legitimate in the eyes of 
many.  Poverty can indeed be reduced by transferring money to the poor, as has been 
seen with the strong downward trend in poverty for the elderly in Canada in recent 
decades due to the introduction of the GIS and CPP. The impact of the NCBS on the 
labour market behaviour of families with children is more difficult to predict.  
 
  While the National Child Benefit Supplement has been successful in achieving its 
objective of reducing child poverty, the impact of changes in other social programs such 
as social assistance and employment insurance has not been as positive. Indeed, these 
policy changes appear to have more than offset the impact of the NCBS on poverty. This 
may account for the limited decline in the poverty rate in the 1990s despite the strong 
economic growth in the latter part of the decade. 
  6
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  On July 1, 1998, the federal, provincial (excluding Quebec), and territorial 
governments introduced the National Child Benefit (NCB), which provided a supplement 
(NCBS) to the basic child benefit to Canadian families with low incomes. One of the 
goals of the initiative was to reduce the rate and depth of poverty suffered by children in 
Canada. The objective of this report is to evaluate the impact of this program on low-
income status of families with children in Canada.  This report presents the results of a 
number of simulations run by Statistics Canada for the Centre for the Study of Living 
Standards (CSLS) with the Social Policy Simulation Database and Model (SPSD/M) on 
different child benefit regimes, isolating the impact of these rules on low-income rates 
and gaps.  The SPSD/M is described in Exhibit 1. 
 
  The report is divided into six parts. Section one examines trends in child poverty 
in Canada in the 1990s. Section two discusses the motivation and nature of the National 
Child Benefit. Section three outlines the 14 scenarios that have been developed for the 
purposes of the impact analysis. Section four analyzes the impact of the introduction of 
the National Child Benefit under 1999 and 2004 rules for three measures of the low-
income or poverty rate and gap for all economic families with children and separately for 
single-parent and two-parent families. The fifth section summarizes the main findings 
and the final section concludes. 
 
   
Trends in Child Poverty in Canada 
 
  Child poverty has increased significantly in Canada in the 1990s. In 1989, the 
proportion of Canadian children living below the poverty line, defined in terms of the 
after-tax Low Income Cutoff or LICO, was 11.8 per cent (Chart 1). With the recession 
and slow recovery of the early and mid-1990s, the child poverty rate rose to a peak of 
16.8 per cent in 1996. The solid economic growth of the late 1990s produced an 
improvement, with child poverty dropping to 13.9 per cent by 1998 and 13.7 per cent in 
1999, the most recent year for which data are available. It is likely that child poverty 
dropped in 2000 with the robust economic growth of 4.4 per cent that year, but the 
                                                 
1 This study was conducted by the Centre for the Study of Living Standards (CSLS) for the Social Policy 
Branch of Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC). The CSLS would like to thank HRDC 
officials Jérộme Mercier, Gary Bagley, and especially Yves Gingras for their support and assistance with 
this project. In addition, the CSLS would like to thank Brian Murphy and his team at Statistics Canada for 
their exemplary work with the SPSD/M, without which this report would not have been produced. The 
study was written by Andrew Sharpe with assistance from Jeremy Smith and Lynne Browne.  9
magnitude of the decline is very uncertain.
2 The poverty rate at the end of the decade was 
thus still nearly 2 per cent age points greater than in 1989. 
 
  The trend in the number of children in poverty has mirrored the evolution of the 
overall child poverty rate (Chart 2). It rose from 786 thousand in 1989 to a peak of 1,186 
in 1996, before decreasing to 978 thousand in 1998 and 962 thousand in 1999, still well 
above the 1989 figure. In absolute terms, the number of children in poverty living in two-
parent families is slightly greater than the number in lone-parent families. But the poverty 
rate for two-parent families is around one fifth that of lone-parent families (Chart 3). In 
1999, the poverty rate for the former was 7.3 per cent compared to 36.9 per cent for the 
latter. Within lone-parent families, families headed by a woman had 2-3 times as high a 
poverty rate as families headed by a man. Like the number of children in poverty, the 
number of families in poverty is roughly equally divided between two-parent families and 
lone-parent families (Chart 4). 
 
  A key determinant of poverty is the number of earners in a family. Families with 
no earners, whether lone parent or two-parent, have much higher poverty rates than 
families with earners (Chart 5). For example, in 1999 the poverty rate for lone-parent 
families with no earners was 86.9 per cent and two-parent families with no earners 77.4 
per cent. In contrast, the rate for lone-parent families with one earner was 32.5 per cent. 
For two-parent families with one earner the poverty rate was 19.1 per cent, falling 
dramatically to 3.7 per cent with two earners. 
 
     The average income gap represents the difference between the income level at the 
poverty threshold and the average income level for households with income below the 
threshold. In 1989, for two parent families with children the gap was $7,019, expressed in 
1999 dollars (Chart 6). It was $5,646 for lone-parent families. The gap for both family 
types rose in the first half of the 1990s, declining during the second part of the decade. 
By 1999, the gap in absolute terms was slightly below the 1989 level ($6,904 for two-




The National Child Benefit Supplement 
 
  The issue of child poverty was high on the political agenda in Canada in the 
1990s, and continues to be today.
4 This political interest was manifested when the House 
of Commons in 1989 unanimously passed a resolution for the government to undertake 
                                                 
2 In 1999, the child poverty rate fell only 0.2 percentage points despite real GDP growth of 5.1 per cent and 
a 0.7 percentage point decline in the unemployment rate. In contrast, in 1998 the child poverty rate fell a 
much greater 2.1 points even though the improvements in economic conditions were comparable (3.9 per 
cent real GDP growth and a 0.8 point fall in the unemployment rate). 
3 If the real value of the poverty threshold increased over the 1989-99 period, the relative income gap (the 
gap as a proportion of the poverty threshold) would not have declined.  
 
4 See, for example, the September 17, 2001 cover story in Maclean’s on child poverty in Canada 
(McClelland, 2001).  10
measures to eliminate child poverty by 2000. This in part explains why during the fiscal 
retrenchment of the 1990s, the federal government chose to allocate additional resources 
and develop new programs to alleviate child poverty. This issue was and is a national 
priority. 
 
The National Child Benefit (NCB) is a partnership between federal, provincial 
and territorial governments to improve the well-being of children in low-income 
families.
5 The three goals of the NCB are: 1) to help prevent and reduce the depth of 
child poverty; 2) to promote attachment to the labour market by ensuring that families 
will always be better off as a result of working;
6 and 3) to reduce overlap and duplication 
by harmonizing program objectives and benefits and simplifying administration. It is the 
evaluation of the attainment of the first of the three objectives that is the focus of this 
report. 
 
The NCB achieves its goals by assisting parents move from welfare into the 
labour market and by helping low-income parents already in the labour market to stay 
there. It provides financial assistance to low-income working families and enhanced 
benefits and services tailored to the needs of all low-income families. The NCB includes 
increased federal income support to Canadian families, called the National Child Benefit 
Supplement (NCBS), and provincial, territorial, and First Nations reinvestments and 
investment in programs and services. 
 
As part of the NCB, the federal government on July 1, 1998 began to provide the 
NCBS to all low-income families, in addition to the basic child benefit already being 
received from the federal government (the basic child benefit and the NCBS together are 
called the Canada Child Tax Benefit or CCTB). This provides a basic level of income 
support for children whether their parents are employed or receiving social assistance. In 
return, most provinces and territories have reduced the level of income support they 
provide children through social assistance while making sure the cash benefits to those 
families are at least as high as they were before the NCB was introduced. The provincial 
and territorial governments have committed themselves to reinvest all savings from their 
reduced social assistance costs in new and enhanced benefits and services for low-income 
families with children.   
 
Under the NCB, when families leave welfare for employment they no longer lose 
that portion of their welfare benefits that went to cover the cost of raising children, which 
is now provided by the NCBS outside the social assistance system. The rationale for the 
introduction of the NCBS was thus to break down the “welfare wall,” that is the financial 
                                                 
5 This section draws on the National Child Benefit Progress Report: 2000 (Federal/Provincial/Territorial 
Ministers Responsible for Social Services, 2001).  
6 This attachment of low-income families to the labour market is valued for both financial and social 
reasons. For example, Kornberger, Fast and Williamson (2001) find that children from working poor 
families had slightly higher levels of verbal development than children from welfare-dependent families 
and that these developmental differences were only partially attributable to differences in home and family 
characteristics of the two groups.  11
barrier represented by the benefits for their children that welfare families lost when they 
made the transition from social assistance to employment.
7 
 
Thus the process of federal increases in the NCBS and the provincial adjustment 
to social assistance (i.e. the clawback) is integral to the restructuring of child benefits that 
the NCB initiative is bringing about. Through this process of federal increases and 
provincial adjustments, child benefits provided through the welfare system are being 
displaced by a national platform of income tested child benefits. 
  
  These income-tested child benefits (the CCTB and the provincial/territorial 
income-tested child benefits) are portable from social assistance to work. Before 
implementation of the NCB, parents leaving social assistance for work often faced the 
loss of important benefits for their children. This served as a disincentive to entering the 
labour force. These income-tested child benefits are also less stigmatizing than child 
benefits delivered through the welfare system. 
 
For the 12 months running from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 1999, the federal 
government allocated $1.1 billion to the NCB supplement. The allocation to the Working 
Income Supplement (WIS), the program the NCB supplement replaced, was $0.5 billion 
in 1997-98 and $0.3 billion in 1995-96 and 1996-97. Since the NCB supplement was 
introduced in 1998-99, the expenditures have been progressively increased, rising to $1.5 
billion in 1999-2000, $1.9 billion in 2000-01 and are forecast at $2.5 billion in 2001-02 
(Federal/Provincial/Territorial Ministers Responsible for Social Services, 2002:33). 
Expenditures on the base child benefit have also risen, from $2.6 billion in 1998-99 to 
$2.7 billion in 1999-00, $2.8 billion in 2000-01 and forecast to increase to $3.1 billion in 
2001-02.  
 
Total expenditures for both the NCB supplement and the basis benefit are 
determined by a number of factors, including statutory benefits per child and income cut-
off levels or thresholds, the rate of inflation, demographic and migration trends affecting 
the number of children, and economic growth, which affects real income levels.     
 
  The rules used for the calculation of the CCTB are complex. From July 1, 2000 to 
June 30, 2001, the basic benefit of the CCTB was calculated for children in all provinces 
and territories, except Alberta, as follows (Government of Canada, 2001): 
 
•   $92 a month for each child under 18; plus 
 
•   $6.41 a month for each third and additional child; plus 
 
•   $18.25 a month for each child under the age of seven, with this amount reduced by 25 
per cent of any amount claimed for child care expenses; and 
 
                                                 
7 For discussion of the motivation behind the NCBS, see Battle (1997a and 1997b), Battle and Mendelson 
(1997) and Battle and Torjman (1993).  12
•   for families with net income greater than $30,004, the benefit is reduced by 2.5 per 
cent for a one-child family and 5 per cent for families with two or more children.  
 
The National Child Benefit Supplement in 2000-2001 was calculated as follows: 
 
•   $81.41 a month for the first child; 
 
•   $64.25 for the second child; 
 
•   $57.83 for each additional child; and 
 
•   for families with net income more than $21,214, the NCBS is reduced 11.1 per cent 
for a one-child family, 19.9 per cent for a two-child family, and 27.8 per cent for 
families with more than two children. 
  
  Based on the above rules, a family with two children between 7 and 17 with net 
income less than $21,214 in 2000-01 received $329.66 per month or $3,955.92 per year. 
This represented a minimum of 18.6 per cent of net income. 
 
The increased total spending for the NCB supplement and the base benefit 
represents a substantial increase in child benefits for poor families. For example, the 
maximum federal child benefit (Canada Tax Benefit and Working Income Supplement) 
in 1996-97 for a family with one child was $1,520. In 2001-02, the benefits increased 56 
per cent to $2,372.  For a family with two children the increase was even larger – 79 per 
cent from $2,540 to $4,544. It was even larger still for families with more than two 
children: 85 per cent for three children from $3,635 to $6,719 and 88 per cent for four 
children from $4,730 to $8,894.  
 
  As noted above, the provinces and territories have used the funds clawed back 
from social assistance recipients to provide additional income support and social services 
for poor families. The value of the cash or income-support of these reinvestments was 
$291 million in 1999-00, rose to $321 million in 2000-01, and is estimated at $379 in 
2001-02. (Appendix Table 1). These cash reinvestments represented 72.2 per cent of the 
value of the NCB reinvestments in 1999-00, 63.2 per cent in 2000-01, and an estimated 
69.2 peer cent in 2001-02. In addition, under the NCB initiative, the provinces and 
territories allocated, over and above their reinvestments, additional resources for child 
programs. These new funds totaled $84 million in 1999-00, $85 million in 2000-01, and 
an estimated $118 million in 2001-02 (Appendix Table 1).    
 
 
Definitions of the Scenarios 
 
A total of 14 scenarios based on different rules for child benefits have been 
defined.  The rules run from July 1 to June 30 of a particular year, but they have been 
applied to the calendar year in which July 1 falls since SPSD/M is on a calendar year  13
basis. These rules are provided in Appendix 2. They were first applied to the Canadian 
population structure as it is estimated for 1997 in the SPSD/M. The year 1997 was the 
most recent base year for the SPSD/M at the time these simulations were conducted. The 
tax and transfer system in place in 1997, as well as the 1997 real income levels and 
income distribution are implicit in the simulations.  
 
The rules were also applied to the estimated population in 2004, with projections 
used for the size and age distribution of the population and the size of the economy and 
real income levels. The tax/transfer system in 2004 used in these simulations is based on 
the most recent rules or changes announced for 2004. The income distribution for 2004, 
however, is assumed identical to that in 1997. Consequently, a total of 28 scenarios were 
run, 14 based on the 1997 population, real income, and tax/transfer system; and 14 based 
on the projected 2004 population, real income, and tax/transfer system. 
 
It is important to acknowledge that the simulations are static in nature and ignore 
any effect that the NCB may have on labour market behaviour. Thus, the dynamic effects 
of the NCB in terms of providing incentives for workers with children to stay in low-
paying jobs and for persons on welfare to seek employment are not captured.  Neither are 
other non-labour market behavioural responses to receiving the NCB captured, such as: a 
greater willingness to report income since low-income recipients face a reduced welfare 
wall and so likely a reduced effective marginal tax rate; and possible changes in decisions 
regarding family formation and dissolution, child support by absent parents, and fertility, 
which could impact either favourably or unfavourably the number of children in low 
income. 
 
It is also important to note the incomplete coverage of social assistance (SA) 
benefits in household surveys such as the SCF and SLID.
8 The underreporting of SA 
benefits results in an overestimation of the number of low-income working families and 
therefore could upwardly bias estimates of the impact of the NCBS.   
 
This also means it is very difficult to model transitions off and onto SA in the 
SPSD/M. It can be assumed that if an individual receives SA at some point during the 
year, she receives it for 12 months of the year. However, recent work
9 suggests that this 
assumption is not realistic.  To address this problem monthly adjustments have been 
made by Statistics Canada, using SA caseload information provided by the provinces of 
Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario and Newfoundland and Labrador.  These data 
have allowed Statistics Canada to better assess the impact of the NCB on a monthly basis 
thus avoiding the assumption that recipients receive SA for the entire year. 
 
The first three of these scenarios (no child benefits; rules in 1977, the last year of 
the Family Allowance before the introduction of the child tax benefit and only tax 
deductions for children; and the rules in 1992 with the Family Allowance with recovery/ 
Child Tax Credit/dependent tax credits) are useful for an historical analysis of the 
                                                 
8 Kapsalis (2001) concludes that the rate of underreporting of SA on the SLID is about 50 per cent. 
9 See Barrett and Cragg (1998), Duclos, Fortin and Roberge (1998) and Ross (2000), for example.  14
evolution of the child benefits system in Canada, but are not relevant for analyzing the 
impact of the NCBS on low-income. Consequently, they will not be discussed in this 
document. The results from these scenarios may be obtained by contacting the CSLS.   
 
Scenario 4 is defined as the Canada Child Tax Benefit (CCTB) base on July 1, 
1996, two year before the NCBS was introduced on July 1, 1998. This benefit goes to a 
high proportion of families with children on a sliding scale basis. The year 1997 was one 
of transition to the NCBS and therefore not appropriate as a benchmark year.
10 In this 
scenario the value of the CCTB has been indexed to inflation to preserve its 1996 real 
value. According to SPSD/M, the total value of this benefit for the 1997 calendar year, 
expressed in 1997 dollars and based on 1997 population, income distribution, and 
tax/transfer system, was $4,825 million. This assumption means that some of the 
enrichment of the NCBS is “eaten away” through indexation relative to a scenario with 
no indexation. 
 
Scenario 5 is defined as the CCTB in place on July 1, 1996 plus the WIS.  Like 
scenario 4, the value of child benefits in this scenario has been indexed to inflation to 
preserve its 1996 real value. According to SPSD/M, the total value of this benefit for the 
1997 calendar year, expressed in 1997 dollars and based on 1997 population, income 
distribution, and tax/transfer system, was $240 million. With the CCTB, total child 
benefits were thus $5,064 million. This scenario is particularly important for the analysis 
in this document as it represents the level of federal child benefits before the introduction 
of the NCBS in 1998. It thus serves as one of the two base or reference cases for the 
impact analysis of the introduction of the NCBS on low income in 1999.   
 
A second assumption is that the child benefits are not indexed between 1996 and 
1999, losing part of their real value. This assumption is incorporated in scenario 14. As 
CPI inflation averaged only 1.5 per cent per year from 1996 to 1999, or 4.5 per cent over 
the total period, the difference between the scenarios in terms of the value of the CCTB 
and WIS are small, although not insignificant. The value of the CCTB is now $4,442 
million (versus $4,823 million in scenario 5) and the WIS $212 million (versus $240 
million in scenario 5), all expressed in 1997 dollars.
11  
 
                                                 
10 The Working Income Supplement (WIS) was a lump-sum payment going to working families.  In 1997, 
as part of the transition to the new system, the WIS was restructured, with maximum benefits increasing 
from $500 per family to $605 for the first child, $405 for the second, and $330 for each additional child. 
11 The ratio of the values under the two scenarios exceed the inflation rate between 1996 and 1999   
for the following reasons. Except for a few WIS recipients, all same size families already in receipt of 
benefits will receive the same increase, equal to the dollar increase in the maximum benefit. Families who 
had been in receipt of the maximum will then realize an increase equal to the inflation rate, but almost all of 
the other families who had been in receipt of reduced benefits will then experience a greater percentage 
increase. Also, the income inflexion points (thresholds) of the NCBS and of the WIS were also indexed, 
resulting in further per cent increases for families affected by the movements in these inflexion points. 
Finally, it is also possible that some families would qualify for some benefits due to indexation, while they 
would not have been qualified without it. 
    15
HRDC and Finance officials have indicated they believe this is the most realistic 
assumption. While recognizing that it is difficult to speculate on what might have 
happened between 1996 and 1999, they believe it is not unreasonable to assume that in 
the absence of the introduction of the NCBS in 1998, there would not have been an 
indexation of child tax benefits before the year 2000, at which point full indexation of the 
fiscal system was reinstituted.     
 
This scenario is particularly important for the analysis in this document as it 
represents the level of federal child benefits before the introduction of the NCBS in 1998. 
It thus serves as the second base or reference case for the impact analysis of the 
introduction of the NCBS on low income in 1999.   
 
Scenario 6 is the first of three scenarios for the child benefit rules in place on July 
1, 1999. It includes the CCTB and the NCBS paid by the federal government based on 
the 1997 population, income distribution, and tax/transfer system. It is important to note 
that the CCTB was not indexed between 1996 and 1999, losing around 5 per cent of its 
real value. For this reason, the value of the CCTB in the 1999 scenarios is less than in the 
indexed 1996 scenario. Under this scenario, the CCTB totaled $4,441 million (compared 
to $4,823 million in 1996) and the NCBS $1,194 million, indicating that total child 
benefits paid by the federal government were $5,635 million. All values are expressed in 
1997 dollars. The replacement of the WIS by the NCBS and changes to the CCTB base 
meant that the value of total federal child benefits based on 1999 rules was $571 million 
or 11.3 per cent greater than the regime based on 1996 rules. This reflected the 
replacement of the WIS by the NCBS, offset somewhat by the erosion in the real value of 
the CCTB because of a lack of indexation.  
 
The introduction of the NCBS on July 1, 1998 was a joint federal, provincial and 
territorial initiative. A key objective of the NCBS is to dismantle the welfare wall and 
make it more worthwhile for persons on welfare to seek work by increasing child benefits 
for the working poor. Social assistance (SA) recipients would no longer lose the 
component of their welfare cheque that was meant to cover the expenses of raising 
children. Most provincial governments reduced or clawbacked a proportion of welfare 
payments to offset the increased benefits welfare families received from the federal 
government arising from the introduction of the NCBS.  
 
Scenario 7 is defined as the CCTB and NCBS paid by the federal government 
based on the rules of July 1, 1999 (basically the same as scenario 6) minus the amount of 
the NCBS clawed back from social assistance recipients by provincial and territorial 
governments. The amount clawed back by provincial government was $309 million from 
provincial social assistance and $167 million from provincial family programs, or a total 
of $476 million. This represents 39.7 per cent of the value of the NCBS under the 1999 
rules in scenario 7 ($1,199 million), 49.6 per cent of the value the NCBS net of the WIS 
in scenario 5 ($959 million), and 82.5 per cent of the total increase (CCTB plus NCBS) in 
federal child benefits between the 1996 (CCTB plus WIS in scenario 5) and 1999 (CCTB 
plus NCBS in scenario 7) rules ($577 million). 
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As part of the joint initiative of Canada’s federal, provincial and territorial 
governments, provincial and territorial governments agreed to use all funds recovered 
from social assistance recipients to provide additional income support benefits for 
working families with children or non-cash benefits for poor families with children in 
general. These provincial income support or cash reinvestment programs in place on July 
1, 1999 have been modeled and incorporated into scenario 8.  
 
The value of these new programs was $340 million, using as a base the value of 
provincial family programs in scenario 7 ($1,023 million) with the SA clawback (the 
value of the cash reinvestments is $173 million when before-clawback scenario 6 is used 
as the base). The net decline in the value of provincial social assistance and family 
programs between the no clawback and no reinvestment scenario 6 ($13,752 million) and 
the clawback and reinvestment scenario 8 ($13,595 million) is $157 million. The 
discrepancy between the value of the clawback ($476 million) and the increase in income 
support programs for poor families with children financed by the NCBS ($340 million) is 
in principle accounted for by increases in non-cash programs for poor families with 
children. These benefits cannot at this time be incorporated into the SPSD/M.   
 
  Five scenarios have been developed with child benefit rules for 2004. Again, 
these rules were being applied to the Canadian population as it is estimated for 1997 (not 
2004) in the SPSD/M. The tax and transfer system in place in 1997, as well as the income 
distribution in 1997 are also again implicit in the simulations. The first of these scenarios, 
scenario 9, is defined at the mature CCTB or base benefit only, valued at $5,470 million, 
expressed in 1997 dollars. This represents an increase of 13.4 per cent in real terms 
relative to the CCTB in place in 1996. 
 
  The second scenario for 2004, scenario 10, is defined as the mature CCTB base 
with the indexed WIS. The value of the WIS was $154 million, down from $240 million 
under 1996 rules in scenario 5. This scenario can be considered the most relevant base 
case for comparing child benefits under the NCBS in 2004. 
 
  The third scenario for 2004, scenario 11, is defined at the mature CCTB and the 
NCBS with neither clawback nor recovery of social assistance or cash reinvestment 
programs. Under 2004 rules, the value of the NCBS is $2,141 million, 79.3 per cent more 
than under 1999 rules, reflecting the enrichment of the benefit. The value of the CCTB is 
virtually unchanged from scenario 10 at $5,467 million (versus $5,468 million in scenario 
10), making the value of total child benefits $7,608 million. 
 
Scenario 12, the fourth scenario with 2004 rules, is defined as the CCTB and 
NCBS paid by the federal government based on the rules of July 1, 2004 (basically the 
same as scenario 11) minus the amount of the NCBS clawed back from social assistance 
recipients by provincial and territorial governments. The amount clawed back by 
provincial government was $431 million from provincial social assistance and $240 
million from provincial family programs, or a total of $671 million. This represents 31.3 
per cent of the value of the NCBS under the 2004 rules ($2,141 million in scenario 11), 
33.8 per cent of the value the NCBS net of the WIS ($1,987 million), and 26.4 per cent of  17
the total increase of $2,544 million in federal child benefits between the 1996 rules 
(CCTB plus WIS in scenario 5) and 2004 rules (CCTB and NCBS in scenario 11).  
 
Scenario 13, the fifth scenario under 2004 rules incorporates the provincial 
income support or cash reinvestment programs expected to be in place on July 1, 2004. 
The value of these new programs was $257 million, using as a base the value of 
provincial family programs in scenario 12 with the SA clawback (the value is only $17 
million when before-clawback scenario 11 is used as the base). The non-indexation of 
these programs between 1999 and 2004 may account for the decline in their real value. 
The net decline in the value of provincial social assistance and family programs between 
the no clawback and no reinvestment scenario 11 and the clawback and reinvestment 
scenario 13 is $420 million. The discrepancy between the value of the clawback ($671 
million) and the increase in income support programs for poor families with children 
($257 million) is in principle accounted for by increases in non-cash programs for poor 
families with children. These benefits cannot at this time be incorporated into the 
SPSD/M. 
 
The Impact of the NCBS on Low Income
12 
 
Definitions of low income 
 
  According to Statistics Canada (2000:122), low income cutoffs (LICOs) are 
established using data from the Survey of Household Spending. They convey the income 
level at which a family may be in straitened circumstances because it has spent a greater 
proportion of its income on necessities than the average family of similar size (44 per 
cent on an after-tax basis and 35 per cent on a before-tax basis in 1992). Specifically, the 
threshold is defined as the income below which a family is likely to spend 20 percentage 
points more of its income on food, shelter and clothing than the average family. There are 
separate cutoffs for seven sizes of family – from unattached individuals to families of 
seven or more persons – and for five sizes of area of residence – from rural areas to urban 
areas with a population of more than 500,000.  
 
LICOs are calculated on both a pre-tax or money income and an after-tax basis. 
Starting with data for 1998, Statistics Canada has chosen to highlight the after-tax rate for 
two reasons. First, income taxes and transfers are essentially two methods of 
redistribution. Thus, the before-tax rates only partly reflect the entire redistributive 
impact of Canada’s tax/transfer system by including the effect of transfers but not the 
effect of income taxes. Second, since the purchase of necessities is made with after-tax 
dollars, it is logical to use people’s after-tax income to draw conclusions about their 
overall economic well-being. 
 
                                                 
12 An earlier set of estimates from this study that did not take into account the average duration of spells 
families remain on social assistance was used in Appendix 4 of the 2001 National Child Benefit Progress 
Report (Federal, Provincial and Territorial Ministers Responsible for Social Services, 2002). The impacts 
of the NCBS on poverty are somewhat larger in this version of the study.   18
  Statistics Canada also produces a third low income definition called the Low 
Income Measure (LIM). Unlike the LICOs, it is a purely relative measure of poverty or 
low income. It is defined as the proportion of households with income below one half 
median equivalent household income. 
 
In this report, all three definitions or concepts of low income are used: the before-
tax LICO, the after-tax LICO, and the after-tax Low Income Measure (LIM). Persons or 
households with equivalent income below these thresholds are defined as low income. 
The three definitions of low income have been applied to both the incidence of low 
income or the low income rate, and to the depth or deficiency of low income or the low 
income gap.  
 
  A large number of groups use Statistics Canada LICO estimates as a de facto 
definition of poverty. The LICOs do not represent Statistics Canada’s view of how 
poverty should be measured (Statistics Canada has in fact no official definition of poverty 
as poverty is a concept that is judgmental or subjective in nature). But, as noted by Chief 
Statistician Ivan Fellegi (Income in Canada, Statistics Canada, 2000:125), Statistics 
Canada has no quarrel with groups who wish to use the LICOs as poverty measures if 
these groups believe the LICOs correspond in their own considered opinion to how 
poverty should be defined in Canada.  In this document, the terms low income and 
poverty will be used interchangeably. 
 
  The poverty measures derived from the income levels calculated from the 
SPSD/M for 1999 are similar but not identical to those published by Statistics Canada for 
1999 based on the SLID.  For example, for the after-tax LICO the poverty rate for 
persons under 18 based on the SLID was 13.7 per cent while that for all families with 
children was 14.5 per cent, based on scenario 8 from SPSD/M, which corresponds the 
closest to what actually happened in 1999. The variation does not reflect differences in 
the definitions of the poverty measures, but rather in the data sources used (SCF for the 
SPSD/M and SLID for Statistics Canada measures) and in the fact that the SPSD/M 
results for 1999 are based on simulations.   
 
Results based on 1999 rules and 1997 population and tax/transfer system 
 
  Table 1 provides estimates of the number of families receiving federal child 
benefits, the average benefits per family, and low income rates and gaps for economic 
families with children for 1997 for the three low income measures for child benefit 
regimes based on two 1996 and three 1999 sets of rules or benefits. The first set of rules 
(number 1 or scenario 5) is that in place on July 1, 1996, indexed to preserve its real 1996 
value for comparison with scenarios based on 1999 rules.  
 
Under this scenario, a total of 3,162 thousand families in Canada received federal 
child benefits in 1996 and the average value of the benefits per family was $1,602 
($1997). The low-income rate was 18.4 per cent for the before-tax LICO, 15.2 per cent 
for the after-tax LICO, and 11.6 per cent for the after-tax LIM. The lower rate for the 
after-tax LICO relative to the before-tax LICO reflects the progressive nature of the  19
income tax system. Some families that are low income before taking taxes into account 
are relatively better off and not low income on an after-tax basis. The lower rate for the 
LIM relative to the two LICO measures reflects the fact that one half equivalent median 
income, the threshold for the LIM, is lower than the thresholds for the two LICO 
measures. 
 
The size of the income gap also follows the pattern for the three low income rates, 
falling from $6,313 million, expressed in 1997 dollars, for the before-tax LICO to $3,722 
million for the after-tax LICO, to $2,072 million for the after-tax LIM.  
 
The impact on changes in the child benefits system on low-income is modeled as 
the difference between the low income estimates under a new or shock set of rules and 
the base case or benchmark or control set of rules. The impact of a lack of indexation of 
child benefits between 1996 and 1999 on low income, the second base case, can be seen 
comparing scenario 14 with scenario 5 (2 with 1 in Table 1). Without indexation, the low 
income rate is 0.1 percentage points higher for the before-tax LICO and 0.2 percentage 
points higher for both the after-tax LICO and after-tax LIM. The low-income gap ranges 
from $38 million to $82 million greater. This is not a large difference in absolute terms, 
but it can be important for the analysis of differences in differences. For those who feel 
that there would have been some indexation in child benefits over this period if the 
NCBS had not been introduced, scenario 5 may be a more appropriate benchmark for 
impact calculations. 
 
  Table 2, calculated from Table 1, provides the impact or shock minus control 
results of the introduction of the NCBS on the number of families receiving federal child 
benefits, average benefits and low income rates and gaps for the three low income 
measures under 1999 child benefit rules for three scenarios. There are two base cases, 
that is the indexation base case or scenario 5 and the non-indexation base case or scenario 
14. The first is the CCTB plus WIS in 1996, with the value of benefits indexed to 
maintain its real value. The second is the unindexed 1996 value of the CCTB plus the 
WIS. 
 
  The introduction of the NCBS, combined with the erosion of the real value of the 
CCTB between 1996 and 1999, would have reduced by 1999 the before-tax LICO 0.6 
percentage points relative to the rate under child benefit levels in 1996. The reduction for 
the after-tax LICO was greater (1.0 points), and for the after-tax LIM even more (1.6 
points). The introduction of the NCBS reduced the low income gap by $614 million 
under the before-tax LICO, $512 million for the after-tax LICO, and $426 million under 
the after-tax LIM.  Since the absolute size of the gap declines as one moves from the 
before-tax LICO to the after-tax LICO to the after-tax LIM, the per cent decline in the 
low income gap actually increases, going from 9.7 per cent for the before-tax LICO to 
13.8 per cent for the after-tax LICO to 20.6 per cent for the after-tax LIM. The average 
value of federal child benefits increased $220 relative to benefits received in 1996.   
 
  These results, of course, exclude the impact of the recovery of social assistance 
and the cash reinvestment programs on low income. Obviously, the clawback on SA from  20
welfare recipients reduces significantly the impact of the NCBS on low income, as seen 
in a comparison of the difference between scenario 7 and 5 relative to the difference 
between scenario 6 and 5.  For the before-tax LICO, the impact of the NCBS on low 
income falls to 0.3 points from 0.6 points, for the after-tax LICO to 0.4 points from 1.0 
points, and for the after-tax LIM to 0.4 points from 1.6 points. There are comparable 
absolute and relative declines for the low-income gap. 
 
  The inclusion of the new provincial cash reinvestment or income support 
programs financed by the SA clawback offsets some, but generally not all, of the negative 
impact of the SA clawbacks on the poverty-reduction effects of the NCBS, as seen in 
Table 2 (scenario 8 minus 5). The impacts on the low income rates and gaps for five of 
the six measures are between the results without clawback and reinvestment and the 
results with clawback of SA.  
 
This difference between scenarios 8 and 5 (5-1 in Table 2) is the most important 
impact for evaluating the CCTB as it captures the complete dynamics of the CCTB, the 
introduction of the benefit by the federal government, the clawback of social assistance 
by provincial governments, and the introduction of new income support programs for 
families with children by provincial governments. The impact on the poverty rate ranges 
from 0.6 points for the before-tax LICO to 0.8 points for the after-tax LIM, or 3.3 per 
cent to 6.9 per cent. The after-tax LICO impact is 4.6 per cent (Chart 7). The impact on 
the poverty gap ranges from 6.3 per cent for the before-tax LICO to 12.1 per cent for the 
after-tax LIM. The after-tax LICO poverty gap impact is 8.7 per cent (Chart 7). 
 
  The results based on the non-indexation reference case (second part of Table 2) 
differ somewhat from the results based on the indexation case. The after-tax LICO 
poverty rate now falls 5.8 per cent instead of 4.6 per cent and the poverty gap 10.3 per 
cent instead of 8.7 per cent. The increase in federal child benefits per family is now $318, 
not $221, representing a 21.1 per cent increase, compared to only 13.8 per cent in the 
indexation scenario. This is a significant difference.  
 
  Appendix Table 2 includes estimates of the three poverty rates and gaps under the 
1999 rules for two types of families with children under 18, that is single adult or parent 
families and two or more adult families. Because of conceptual and data problems in the 
SPSD/M associated with the definitions and coding of family type, these results may be 
less reliable than the results for all economic families.  Consequently, they should be 
interpreted with some caution. Appendix Table 3 provides the impact of the NCBS on 
poverty by family type. As noted earlier, the poverty rate for single parent families is 
over four times that of two-parent families (Chart 3).  
 
  In percentage point terms, the impact of the NCBS on the poverty rate is greater 
for single-parent families than for dual-parent families, given the much higher poverty 
rates for the former. But in per cent terms, the impacts are greater for dual-parent 
families. For example, the impact on the after-tax LICO rate of the introduction of the 
NCBS in scenario 8 relative to the base case (scenario 5) for families headed by a single 
parent is 1.3 percentage points, compared to only 0.6 points for families with two parents.  21
But because of the much higher poverty for the former, the per cent impacts are 3.0 per 
cent and 5.8 per cent respectively (Chart 7).  
 
The per cent impacts of the introduction of the NCBS on the absolute poverty gap 
are also greater for dual-parent families. For the after-tax LICO under scenario 8 with 
both clawback and reinvestment programs, the poverty gap falls 7.4 per cent for single-
parent families compared to a 9.5 per cent decline for dual-parent families with children. 
Thus, the poverty-reducing effects of the introduction of the NCBS appear to be 
somewhat greater for two-parent families than single parent families with children. 
 
  The results obtained in this report are similar to those in the recently released 
2001 National Child Benefit Progress Report issued by federal/provincial/territorial 
Ministers responsible for social services. Based on an analysis of the impact on the 
NCBS using the SLID data base, that report found that the pre-tax LICO low-income rate 
fell 0.4 percentage points and the low-income gap 6.5 per cent in 1999 relative to a 
situation where the NCBS had not been introduced. This compares with estimates of 0.6 
percentage points and 6.3 per cent respectively found in this study (Table 2). For the 
post-tax LICO measures, the results were even more similar: 0.7 percentage points for 
both reports and 9.0 per cent for the progress report versus 8.7 per cent for this report. 
 
Results based on 2004 rules and 1997 population and tax/transfer system 
 
Table 3 provides estimates of the number of families receiving federal child 
benefits, average benefits, and low income rates and gaps for economic families with 
children under the population structure and tax/transfer system of 1997 for the three low 
income measures for child benefit regimes based on what would have been the mature 
CCTB with the indexed WIS in 2004 (scenario 10) and three 2004 sets of NCBS rules or 
benefits.  
 
Again, the impact on changes in the child benefits system on low-income is 
modeled as the difference between the low income estimates under a new or shock set of 
rules and the base case or benchmark or control set of rules. Table 4, calculated from 
Table 3, provides the impact or shock minus control results of the introduction of the 
NCBS on low income rates and gaps for economic families with children in Canada for 
the three low income measures under 2004 child benefit rules for three scenarios. Again, 
the base case is scenario 10, that is, the mature CCTB plus the indexed 1996 WIS. 
 
  The introduction of the NCBS by itself by 2004 would have reduced the before- 
tax LICO 1.5 percentage points relative to the rate under child benefit levels in 1996, as 
seen from scenario 11. The reduction for the after-tax LICO was greater (2.3 points), and 
for the after-tax LIM even more (2.7 points). The introduction of the NCBS reduced the 
low income gap by $1,204 million ($1997) under the before-tax LICO, $971 million 
under the after-tax LICO, and $716 million under the after-tax LIM.  Since the absolute 
size of the gap declines as one moves from the before-tax LICO to the after-tax LICO to 
the after-tax LIM, the per cent decline in the low income gap actually increases, going  22
from 18.9 per cent for the before-tax LICO to 25.8 per cent for the after-tax LICO to 34.0 
per cent for the after-tax LIM. 
 
  These results of course exclude the impact of the recovery of social assistance and 
the cash reinvestment programs on low income. Obviously, the clawback of SA benefits 
from welfare recipients reduces significantly the impact of the NCBS on low income, as 
seen in a comparison of the difference between columns one and two in Table 4 (scenario 
11 minus scenario 10 compared to scenario 12 minus scenario 10). For the before-tax 
LICO, the impact of the NCBS on low income falls to 1.0 points from 1.5 points, for the 
after-tax LICO to 1.5 points from 2.3 points, and for the after-tax LIM to 1.3 points from 
2.7 points. There are comparable absolute and relative declines for the low income gap. 
 
  The inclusion of the new provincial cash reinvestment or income support 
programs financed by the SA clawback offsets some, but generally not all, of the negative 
impact of the SA clawbacks on the poverty-reduction effects of the NCBS, as seen in 
column 3 of Table 4 (scenario 13 minus scenario 10). The impacts on the low income 
rates and gaps for the six measures are between the results without clawback and 
reinvestment and the results with clawback of SA.  
 
This difference between scenario 13 and 10 (column 3 in Table 4) is the most 
important impact for evaluating the NCBS as it captures the complete dynamics of the 
NCBS, the introduction of the benefit by the federal government, the clawback of social 
assistance by provincial governments, and the introduction of new income support 
programs for families with children by provincial governments. The impact on the 
poverty rate ranges from 1.3 points for the before-tax LICO to 1.6 points for the after-tax 
LIM to 1.8 points for the after-tax LICO. In percentage terms, these declines were 7.0 per 
cent, 13.6 per cent, and 11.8 per cent respectively. The impact on the poverty gap ranges 
from 13.2 per cent for the before-tax LICO, to 18.0 per cent for the after-tax LICO, to 
23.0 per cent for the after-tax LIM. 
 
Appendix Table 4 includes estimates of the three poverty rates and gaps under the 
2004 rules for two types of families with children under 18, that is single adult or parent 
families and two or more adult families. Appendix Table 5 provides the impact of the 
NCBS on poverty by family type. Again, the percentage impact tends to be somewhat 
higher for two-parent families.  
 
Results based on 2004 population and tax/transfer system 
 
  The most recent version of the SPSD/M at the time these simulations were run 
was based on the actual 1997 population structure and tax/transfer system. The SPSD/M 
can also be run with a projected population structure and tax/transfer system. 
Consequently, the same set of simulations has been run for the age structure, tax transfer 
system, and real income levels projected to exist in 2004. The income distribution is 
however assumed the same as in 1997. Appendix Table 6 shows these results and 
Appendix Table 7 the impacts for the 1999 rules, while Appendix Table 8 shows the 
results and Appendix Table 9 the impacts for the 2004 rules.  23
 
  The two LICO poverty rates are 3-4 percentage points lower under 2004 
demographic and economic projections than under the actual 1997 population, real 
income levels and tax/transfer system while the LIM poverty rate is virtually identical. 
This difference is accounted for by the fact that LICO poverty measures are partly 
absolute in nature, with real income growth reducing poverty while the LIM is a relative 
poverty measure, with real income growth having no effect on the poverty rate when the 
distribution of income is unchanged. Real income levels are assumed to grow 
significantly in the 1997-2004 period. 
 
  More importantly, the impact of the introduction of the NCBS on poverty rates 
and gaps is not greatly affected by the shift to 2004 demographic and economic 
projections from the actual 1997 values for these variables. As there is uncertainty 
associated with these projections, the analysis in this report will be restricted to the 
simulations based on the actual values of the underlying demographic, fiscal, and 
economic variables in 1997.  
 
Impact of the NCBS on average child benefits received and number  
of families receiving benefits 
 
Table 5 provides estimates of the average child benefits received for families 
receiving benefits and the number of economic families receiving benefits for a number 
of scenarios using 1999 and 2004 rules under the 1997 population and tax/transfer system 
by family type. The introduction of the NCBS under 1999 rules increased the real value 
of benefits for single parent families receiving benefits relative to the base scenario 5 
(indexed 1996 child benefit rates) an average 33.3 per cent from $1,804 to $2,405 (1997 
dollars). When the unindexed base is used the increase becomes 40.0 per cent. The 
increase for dual-parent families was only 5.8 per cent in the indexed scenario, but rises 
to 16.2 per cent in the unindexed scenario. Under 2004 rules, the value of the child 
benefits for single-parent families rises to $3,065 (1997 dollars), a 69.9 per cent increase 
relative to the base scenario. For two parent families under 2004 rules, it is $1,806 (1997 
dollars), a 45.3 per cent increase. 
 
The number of single parent families with children receiving child benefits under 
1996, 1999, and 2004 rules is stable. In the base scenario for 1996 with the CCTB and 
WIS indexed to maintain their value in 1999, 552 thousand families received child 
benefits. This actually dropped to 550 thousand in the three scenarios based on 1999 
rules, and then rose to 556 thousand under 2004 rules. This situation implies that the 
NCBS is supplementing the incomes of single-parent families who already receive child 
benefits, and is not going to families who do not already receive benefits. 
 
The situation for two-parent families is somewhat different. In the base scenario 
for 1996 with the CCTB and WIS indexed to maintain their value in 1999, 2,648 
thousand families received child benefits. This dropped 2.6 per cent to 2,543 thousand in 
the three scenarios based on 1999 rules, and then rose 11.5 per cent to 2,911 thousand 
under 2004 rules. This increase under 2004 rules implies that the NCBS is going to a  24
significant number of families (300 thousand) who previously did not receive child 
benefits. 
 
Proportion of NCBS funds going to persons in poverty 
 
It appears that only a relatively small proportion of the additional resources that 
the federal government has devoted to the child benefits program will actually go to the 
poor. Relative to the 1996 rules in scenario 5 (CCTB plus WIS indexed to maintain its 
real 1996 value), federal child benefits increase by $2,544 million under the 2004 rules 
(scenario 11). Yet the decline in the before-tax LICO income gap for economic families 
with children is $1,154 million, indicating that only 45.4 per cent went to families below 
the before-tax LICO. The proportion is even smaller for the other two measures of low-
income – 36.8 per cent for the after-tax LICO and 26.9 per cent for the after-tax LIM.  
 
This situation reflects a number of factors, outlined below: 
 
•   a significant part of the overall increase in child benefits between the 1996 and 
2004 rules is the increase in the basic benefit ($644 million) which goes to a high 
proportion of all families with children and most of these families are above the 
poverty line;  
 
•   the NCBS goes to many families above the low-income cut-off because of the use 
of net income as the income definition for benefit determination (in contrast, 
gross income is used in the calculation of both the LICO and LIM measures);  
 
•   the use of the income of census families (which includes the income of adult 
children and others adults in the household) for determination of low-income rates 
while the income of only the two parents (nuclear family) is used to determine 
eligibility for the child benefit – this means that the NCBS is going to families 
with medium or even high incomes in cases where these incomes are not earned 
by the two parents; and 
 
•   the decline in the poverty gap and hence proportion of the NCBS going to poverty 
reduction is much less between scenario 5 and scenario 12 (i.e. the scenario with 
the clawback of the NCBS going to social assistance recipients by most provincial 
governments) and also less between scenario 5 and scenario 13 (clawback and 
reinvestment of cash provincial programs), although this scenario fails to include 
in the low-income measures the non-cash benefits of provincial family support 
programs financed in part by the clawback.  
 
 
Summary Observations on Results 
 
  This section provides a number of summary observations on the impact of the 
NCBS on poverty in Canada. 
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•   The impact of the changes in the child benefits, primarily the establishment of the  
NCBS, on the low-income or poverty rate, expressed in terms of percentage 
points, is quite consistent across the three measures of low income. The difference 
between the scenarios based on 1996 and 1999 rules (including clawback and 
reinvestment) ranges from -0.6 to -0.8 points and between the scenarios based on 
2004 and 1996 rules from -1.3 to -1.8 points. In per cent terms, the impact is 
inversely proportional to the level of the poverty or low-income rate. It is highest 
for the after-tax LIM, which has the lowest poverty rate, and lowest for the 
before-tax LICO, which has the highest poverty rate. 
  
•   The impact of the NCBS on the low-income gap is always greater than on the 
low-income rate, expressed in percentage terms. For the before-tax LICO, the per 
cent impact on the low-income gap is about twice that on the low-income rate 
under both 1999 and 2004 rules; for the after-tax LICO, the impact was around 67 
per cent greater for the gap under 1999 rules and 40 per cent greater under 2004 
rules; for the after-tax LIM, the impact was at least 50 per cent greater for the gap 
under 1999 and 2004 rules.  
 
•   In terms of the overall effect of the NCBS relative to the 1996 base, around 40 per 
cent of the impact on the low-income rate and gap is realized by 1999, with the 
other 60 per cent realized between 1999 and 2004, at least for the after-tax LICO. 
 
•   The impact of the NCBS in terms of the per cent change in the poverty rate and 






The policy objectives of the NCBS include both the reduction in the poverty rate 
of families with children in Canada and, more importantly, the decrease in the depth of 
poverty for these families. The results of the simulations reported on in this paper suggest 
that such a reduction was achieved by 1999, and will be even greater by 2004.  
 
According to the after-tax LICO, now the most widely reported measure of low 
income or poverty, the national poverty rate for economic families with children – after 
the provincial clawback of NCBS from social assistance recipients and the provincial re-
investment in cash or income-support programs (excluding in-kind programs) are 
factored in – fell 4.6 per cent between 1996 (indexed benefits levels) and 1999 because of 
the introduction of the NCBS. The drop in the poverty gap was even greater: 8.7 per cent 
(Table 2). The impacts are somewhat larger – 5.8 per cent and 10.3 per cent respectively 
– when 1996 benefits are not indexed.  
 
Under the rules set to be in place by 2004, the decline in both the poverty rate and 
the gap, relative to what would have prevailed under the pre-NCBS rules, is expected to 
be significantly greater than has occurred by 1999. The after-tax LICO rate is projected to  26
fall 11.8 per cent and the poverty gap 18.0 per cent relative to the rates and gap that 
would have prevailed in the pre-NCBS world (Table 4). The improvement in the 
economic well-being of low-income families with children would likely be even larger if 
the impact of provincial in-kind programs financed by the NCBS through the social 
assistance clawback were included. 
 
Given the amount of resources devoted to the NCBS, these declines in the poverty 
rate and gap for families with children are not surprising. Indeed, they would have been 
even greater if a larger portion of NCBS funds went to the poor, although the reasons this 
is not the case – the use of net income and the income of only the two parents (excluding 
the income of other family member) for NCBS eligibility– are legitimate in the eyes of 
many.  Poverty can indeed be reduced by transferring money to the poor, as has been 
seen with the strong downward trend in poverty for the elderly in Canada in recent 
decades due to the introduction of the GIS and CPP (Osberg, 2001). The impact of the 
NCBS on the labour market behaviour of families with children is more difficult to 
predict. The NCB Working Group is currently having evaluation work undertaken on this 
issue. 
 
  While the National Child Benefit Supplement has been successful in achieving its 
objective of reducing child poverty, the impact of changes in other social programs such 
as social assistance and employment insurance has not been as positive. Indeed, these 
policy changes appear to have more than offset the impact of the NCBS on poverty. This 
may account for the limited decline in the poverty rate in the 1990s despite the strong 
economic growth in the latter part of the decade.
13 
                                                 
13 Two major changes in social programs in Canada in the 1990s were the cuts to social assistance and to 
employment insurance.  From 1996 to 1999, Picot et al. (2001) find that average social assistance benefits 
going to low-income families headed by a person under 65 fell $523 (1996$) per family while average EI 
benefits decreased $185.  In contrast, other benefits, largely child benefits, increased $436.  Overall, 
average total transfers were down  $271.  The decline was less than the $435 fall per family recorded in the 
1993-96 period when social assistance dropped $266, employment insurance $229, and other benefits only 
rose by $60.  In contrast to the post-1993 period, the 1980s and early 1990s saw large increases in total 
transfers to the poor, reducing the poverty rate. For example, between 1981 and 1989 total transfers to low-
income families headed by a person below 65 increased $979 per family. Between 1988 and 1993 they 
increased a further $1,025.  27
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Appendix 1 
 
Description of the SPSD/M 
Statistics Canada’s Social Policy Simulation Database and Model (SPSD/M) is a 
tool designed to assist those interested in analyzing the financial interactions of 
governments and individuals in Canada.  The SPSD/M is a static microsimulation model 
that has been in use by policy analysts in Canada since 1985.  It can help one to assess the 
cost implications or income redistributive effects of changes in the personal taxation and 
cash transfer system.  As the name implies, SPSD/M consists of two integrated parts: a 
database (SPSD), and a model (SPSM).  The SPSD is a non-confidential, statistically 
representative database of individuals in their family context, with enough information on 
each individual to compute taxes paid to and cash transfers received from government.  
The SPSM is a static accounting model which processes each individual and family on 
the SPSD, calculates taxes and transfers using legislated or proposed programs and 
algorithms, and reports on the results.  
The SPSD was constructed by combining individual administrative data from 
personal income tax returns and Employment Insurance claimant histories with survey 
data on family incomes, employment and expenditure patterns.  The techniques used to 
create the database and avoid confidential data disclosure include various forms of 
categorical matching and stochastic imputation.  While no one record on the database 
contains information for the same individual from the five bases, the database has been 
constructed in such a way as to provide a micro-statistically representative sample of 
Canadians. 
Certain adjustments have been made to the data that force agreement between 
data and known control totals.  For example, survey weights have been adjusted to ensure 
that the population by age and sex corresponds to census data, and the number of high 
income Canadians corresponds to the number reported by Revenue Canada.  Further 
adjustments have been made to compensate for item non-response in the surveys (e.g. to 
increase the number of families receiving social assistance).  It should be noted that the 
SPSD coverage does not extend to the Yukon or Northwest Territories, persons residing 
on reservations, or armed forces personnel residing in barracks. 
The central program, the SPSM, is a micro-simulation-based model that calculates 
taxes and transfers for individuals and families as appropriate.  These calculations are 
performed for everyone on the SPSD and then aggregated to obtain estimates.  The 
SPSM is a static impact model and is therefore not intended to simulate how an 
individual's behaviour is likely to change in response to various policy options. The 
SPSM is driven by over 750 parameters that control three main processes. The SPSM is 
written and compiled using the C programming language.  
 
The SPSD/M comes with the necessary algorithms and parameters to simulate the 
Canadian tax/transfer systems from 1988 to 2005. The tax algorithms simulate all major 
federal and provincial personal income taxes and payroll taxes. Cash transfers simulated  30
include all major federal and provincial transfer programs such as Unemployment 
Insurance Benefits, Old Age Security benefits, Guaranteed Income Supplement benefits, 
Family Allowance benefits, the Child Tax Credit, the Federal Child Benefit, and the Sales 
Tax Credit.  All algorithms operate on an annualized basis. 31
Appendix 2  
Definition of Scenarios 
Base FA FA/CTC  CTB96 CTBWIS96 CTBS99 CTBSC99 CTBSCR99  CTB04 CTBWIS04 CTBS04 CTBSC04 CTBSCR04
Program Element  1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 11 12 13 14 
Family  Allowance    X                  
Child 
Deductions/credits 
  X  X                
Child Tax Credit      X                     
Child Tax Benefit 
(Base) 
      X X  X X  X X X  X X  X  X 
Working Income 
Supplement 
      X       X       
Unindexed Working 
Income Supplement 
                  X  
Child Benefit 
Supplement 
        X  X X    X  X X 
Clawback/Recovery            X X       X X 
Reinvestment              X        X 
2004 NCTB rules                  X  X  X  X  X 
      
CB Rules at July 1, 
19XX/20XX 
 1977  1992  1996 1996 1999 1999 1999  2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 1999
      
       Scenario Definitions 
 
1.  Base year of SPSD/M with no child benefits (1997) 
2.  Rules of 1977 Last year of Family Allowance only plus tax deductions for children 
3.  Rules of 1992 Family Allowance with recovery/Child Tax Credit/dependant tax credits 
4.  Rules at July 1, 1996 – CCTB base only (same rules apply 1996 through 1999) 
5.  Rules at July 1, 1996 – CCTB plus WIS 
6.  Rules at July 1, 1999 – CCTB + NCBS (No re-investment/recovery programs) 
7.  Rules at July 1, 1999 – CCTB + NCBS with recovery of SA (no cash reinvestment) 
8.  Rules at July 1, 1999 – CCTB + NCBS with recovery of SA  and cash reinvestment programs 
9.  Rules at July 1, 2004 - Mature CCTB base only (No re-investment/recovery programs) 
10. Rules at July 1, 2004 - Mature CCTB base with indexed 1996 WIS (No re-investment/recovery 
programs) 
11. Rules at July 1, 2004 - Mature CCTB + NCBS (No re-investment/recovery programs) 
12. Rules at July 1, 2004 - Mature CCTB + NCBS with recovery of SA (No re-investment)  
13. Rules at July 1, 2004 - Mature CCTB + NCBS with recovery of SA  and cash reinvestment programs 
14. Rules at July 1, 1999 – Unindexed CCTB + WIS deflated to 1997$ (No re-investment/recovery 
programs) 




Low-Income Rates and Gaps with 1997 Population and Tax/Transfer System under 
1999 Rules for Child Benefits for Economic Families with Children 
 
Scenarios 
1.  Rules at July 1, 1996 CCTB plus WIS fully indexed to 1999 (scenario 5 in 
detailed tables) 
 
2.  Rules at July 1, 1996 not indexed to 1999 (scenario 14 in detailed tables) 
 
3.  Rules at July 1, 1999 CCTB plus NCBS (no recovery of SA and re-investment) 
(scenario 6 in detailed tables) 
 
4.  Rules at July 1, 1999 CCTB plus NCBS with recovery of SA (no reinvestment) 
(scenario 7 in detailed tables) 
 
5.  Rules at July 1, 1999- CCTB+NCBS with recovery of SA and cash reinvestment 
programs (scenario 8 in detailed tables) 
 
1 2   3   4   5  
Families receiving federal 
child  benefits  (000s)   3,162 3,093   3,093   3,093   3,093 
 
Total federal child 
benefits  (millions  
of  1997  dollars)    5,064 4,654   5,635   5,641   5,640 
 
Average  benefits    1,602 1,505   1,822   1,824   1,823 
received per family 
(1997 dollars) 
 
Below before-tax LICO 
low  income  rate  (%)    18.4 18.5   17.8   18.1   17.8  
low  income  gap    6,313 6,395   5,699   6,058   5,914  
Below after-tax LICO 
low  income  rate  (%)    15.2 15.4   14.2   14.8   14.5  
low  Income  gap     3,722      3,789   3,210   3,504   3,397   
Below after-tax LIM 
low  income  rate  (%)    11.6 11.8   10.0   11.2   10.8  
low  income  gap      2,072 2,110   1,646   1,883   1,822  
 
  Note: The gap is expressed in millions of 1997 dollars  33
Table 2 
 
Shock-Minus-Control Impacts on Low-Income Rates and Gaps with 1997 
Population and Tax/Transfer System under 1999 Rules for Child Benefits for 
Economic Families with Children 
Scenarios 
1.  Reference Case 1:Rules at July 1, 1996 CCTB plus WIS fully indexed to 1999 
(scenario   5 in detailed tables) 
2.  Reference Case 2: Rules at July 1, 1996 not indexed to 1999 (scenario 14 in detailed 
tables) 
3.  Rules at July 1, 1999 CCTB plus NCBS (no recovery of SA and re-investment) 
(scenario 6 in detailed tables) 
4.  Rules at July 1, 1999 CCTB plus NCBS with recovery of SA (no reinvestment) 
(scenario 7 in detailed tables) 
5.  Rules at July 1, 1999- CCTB+NCBS with recovery of SA and cash reinvestment 
programs (scenario 8 in detailed tables) 
 
Reference Case Based on Indexation of 1996 Benefits 
       3-1   4-1   5-1   
 
Families  receiving  federal     -69   -69   -69   
child benefits (000s) 
 
Federal child benefits  
per  family  (1997  dollars)     220   222   221 
 
Below before-tax LICO 
incidence of low income (percentage points)   -0.6    -0.3    -0.6   
incidence of low income (per cent)      -3.3    -1.6    -3.3 
low income gap (millions of 1997 dollars)    -614    -255    -399 
low  income  gap  (per  cent)     -9.7   -4.0   -6.3 
  
Below after-tax LICO 
incidence of low income(percentage points)    -1.0    -0.4    -0.7   
incidence of low income (per cent)      -6.6    -2.6    -4.6   
low income gap (millions of 1997 dollars)    -512    -218    -325   
low  income  gap  (per  cent)     -13.8   -5.9   -8.7 
  
Below after-tax LIM 
incidence of low income (percentage points)   -1.6    -0.4    -0.8  
incidence of low income (per cent)      -13.8    -3.4    -6.9  
low income gap (millions  of 1997 dollars)    -426    -189    -250   
low income gap  (per cent)        -20.6    -9.1    -12.1    34
Reference Case Based on Non-Indexation of 1996 Benefits 
 
      3-2   4-2   5-2   
    
Families  receiving  federal     0   0   0   
child benefits (000s) 
 
Federal child benefits  
per  family  (1997  dollars)     317   319   318 
 
Below before-tax LICO 
incidence of low income (percentage points)   -0.7    -0.4    -0.7   
incidence of low income (per cent)      -3.8    -2.2    -3.8 
low income gap (millions of 1997 dollars)    -696    -337    -481 
low  income  gap  (per  cent)     -10.9   -5.3   -7.5 
  
Below after-tax LICO 
incidence of low income(percentage points)    -1.2    -0.6    -0.9   
incidence of low income (per cent)      -7.8    -3.9    -5.8   
low income gap (millions of 1997 dollars)    -579    -285    -392   
low  income  gap  (per  cent)     -15.3   -7.5   -10.3 
  
Below after-tax LIM 
incidence of low income (percentage points)   -1.8    -0.6    -1.0  
incidence of low income (per cent)      -15.3    -5.1    -8.5 
low income gap (millions  of 1997 dollars)    -464    -227    -288   




Low-Income Rates and Gaps with 1997 Population and Tax/Transfer System under 




1.  Rules at July 1, 2004- mature CCTB plus indexed 1996 WIS (scenario 10 in 
detailed tables) 
2.  Rules at July 1, 2004- mature CCTB+NCBS without SA recovery and re-investment 
(scenario 11 in detailed tables) 
3.  Rules at July 1, 2004- mature CCTB+NCBS with SA recovery and no re-investment 
(scenario 12 in detailed tables) 
4.  Rules at July 1, 2004- mature CCTB+NCBS with SA recovery and re-investment 
(scenario 13 in detailed tables) 
 
1    2   3   4 
  
Families receiving federal 
child  benefits  (000s)   3,467    3,467   3,467   3,467 
Total federal child benefits 
(millions  of  1997  dollars)  5,622    7,608   7,618   7,617 
Federal child benefits 
per  family  (1997  dollars)  1,622    2,194   2,197   2,197 
  
Below before-tax LICO 
low  income  rate  (%)   18.5    17.0   17.5   17.2   
low  income  gap     6,363    5,159   5,643   5,522   
Below after-tax LICO 
low  income  rate  (%)   15.3    13.0   13.8   13.5   
low  Income  gap     3,757        2,786   3,167   3,080   
Below after-tax LIM 
low  income  rate  (%)   11.8    9.1   10.5   10.2   
low  income  gap     2,104    1,388   1,674   1,621   




Shock-Minus-Control Impacts on Low-Income Rates and Gaps with 1997 
Population and Tax/Transfer System under 2004 Rules for Child Benefits for 
Economic Families with Children 
 
Scenarios 
   
1.  Reference Case: Rules at July 1, 2004- mature CCTB plus indexed 1996 WIS 
(scenario 10 in detailed tables) 
2.  Rules at July 1, 2004- mature CCTB+NCBS (no SA recovery and re-investment 
(scenario 11 in detailed tables) 
3.  Rules at July 1, 2004- mature CCTB+NCBS with SA recovery and no re-investment 
(scenario 12 in detailed tables) 
4.  Rules at July 1, 2004- mature CCTB+NCBS with SA recovery and re-investment 
(scenario 13 in detailed tables) 
 
      2-1   3-1   4-1   
 
Families  receiving  federal     0   0   0   
child benefits (000s) 
 
Federal child benefits  
per  family  (1997  dollars)     572   575   575 
       
Below before-tax LICO 
incidence of low income (percentage points)   -1.5    -1.0    -1.3   
incidence of low income (per cent)      -8.1    -5.4    -7.0 
low income gap (millions of 1997 dollars)    -1,204   -720    -841 
low  income  gap  (per  cent)     -18.9   -11.3   -13.2 
  
Below after-tax LICO 
incidence of low income(percentage points)    -2.3    -1.5    -1.8   
incidence of low income (per cent)      -15.0    -9.8    -11.8   
low income gap (millions of 1997 dollars)    -971    -590    -677   
low  income  gap  (per  cent)     -25.8   -15.7   -18.0 
  
Below after-tax LIM 
incidence of low income (percentage points)   -2.7    -1.3    -1.6 
incidence of low income (per cent)      -22.9    -11.0    -13.6  
low income gap (millions  of 1997 dollars)    -716    -430    -483   
low income gap  (per cent)        -34.0    -20.4    -23.0  37
Table 5 
 
Average Child Benefits Received and Number of Economic Families Receiving 
Child Benefits with 1997 Population and Tax/Transfer System under 1999 and 2004 




1.  Rules at July 1, 1996 CCTB plus WIS fully indexed to 1999 (scenario 5 in detailed 
tables) 
2.  Rules at July 1, 1996 not indexed to 1999 (scenario 14 in detailed tables) 
3.  Rules at July 1, 1999 CCTB plus NCBS (no recovery of SA and re-investment) 
(scenario 6 in detailed tables) 
4.  Rules at July 1, 1999 CCTB plus NCBS with recovery of SA (no reinvestment) 
(scenario 7 in detailed tables) 
5.  Rules at July 1, 1999- CCTB+NCBS with recovery of SA and cash reinvestment 
programs (scenario 8 in detailed tables) 
6.  Rules at July 1, 2004 – mature CCTB base with indexed 1999 WIS (scenario 10) 
7.  Rules at July 1, 2004- mature CCTB+NCBS (no SA recovery and re-investment 
(scenario 11 in detailed tables) 
8.  Rules at July 1, 2004- mature CCTB+NCBS with SA recovery and no re-investment 
(scenario 12 in detailed tables) 
9.  Rules at July 1, 2004- mature CCTB+NCBS with SA recovery and re-investment 
(scenario 13 in detailed tables) 
 
Average Child Benefits Received (1997 dollars) 
 
  1   2   3   4   5  
One adult  
with  children   1,804   1,718   2,405   2,409   2,409 
Two+ adults  
With  children   1,243   1,132   1,315   1,316   1,316 
 
   6   7   8   9 
One adult  
with  children   1,824   3,065   3,071   3,071 
Two+ adults  








   38
Number of Economic Families Receiving Child Benefits (thousands) 
 
   1   2   3   4   5 
 
One adult 
with  children   552   550   550   550   550 
Two+ adults 
With  children   2,611   2,543   2,543   2,543   2,543 
 
   6   7   8   9 
One adult  
with  children   556   556   556   556 
Two+ adults  
With  children   2,911   2,911   2,911   2,911  39
Source: Table 8.1, Income in Canada, 1998 and 1999.
Chart 1
Child Poverty in Canada, 1989-1999
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% 40
Source: Table 8.1, Income in Canada, 1998 and 1999.
Chart 2
Number of Children in Poverty in Canada by Family Type, 1989-1999
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Source: Table 8.3, Income in Canada, 1998 and 1999.
(after-tax LICO, 1992 base)
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Source: Table 8.3, Income in Canada, 1998 and 1999.
Chart 4
Number of Families in Poverty by Family Type, 1989-1999
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Source: Table 8.3, Income in Canada, 1998 and 1999.
Chart 5
Poverty Rate by Number of Earners, 1989-1999
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Source: Table 8.3, Income in Canada, 1998 and 1999.
Average Income Gap for Families in Poverty by Family Type, 1989-1999









1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
two-parent families with children total lone-parent families
1999 constant dollars
  45
Source: CSLS estimates based on SPSD/M
Chart 7
Impact of NCBS on Low Income in Canada, 1999 and 2004
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Tables in the Appendix 
 
Appendix Table 1 
 
NCB Supplement and NCB Initiatives by Province and Territory 
    
Column Definition 
 
1.  National Child Benefit Supplement paid by  
federal government (goes to SA and non-SA poor families) 
2.  Total NCB Initiatives (Reinvestments plus Investments) 
by province (millions) (sum of columns 3 and 4) 
3.  Total NCB Reinvestments by province (equal to SA clawback)  
4.  Total NCB Investments (new funds) by province 
5.  Amount of NCB Initiatives going to cash or income-support 
 programs ( all child benefits and earnings supplements programs 
 and some child care and shelter supplements) for all poor families by province  
6.  Proportion of NCB Reinvestments to the NCB supplement (column 3/1) 
7.  Proportion of Income Support to Reinvestment or clawback (column 5/3) 
 
July 1, 1999- June 30, 2000 (expenditures) 
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    (7)   
     (millions  of  dollars) 
 
Newfoundland    31  13.2  5.1 8.1 6.4 16.5%  125.5% 
PEI      7 1.4  1.4  0 0 20.0  0 
Nova Scotia    50  16.9  16.9  0  16.2    33.8  95.9 
New  Brunswick 41  5.3  0 5.3  0 0 0 
Quebec             341  na  na  na  na  na  na 
Ontario            504  184.0  151.0  33  153.8  30.0  101.9 
Manitoba    69  19.4 15.6 3.8  0  22.6 0 
Saskatchewan    70  45.1 22.2 22.9 19.8 31.7 89.2 
Alberta              138  22.0  22.0  0  4.6  15.9  20.9 
British Columbia        199  121.3  121.3  0  85.4  61.0  70.4 
 
Provincial  total  1450  428.6 355.5 73.1  286.2 32.0  80.5 
 
Yukon      2  0.6 0.2 0.4 0.3 10.0  150.0 
Nunavut    3  2.3 1.6 0.7 2.0 53.3  125.0 
NWT      3  2.1 0.7 1.4 2.0 23.3  285.7 
First Nations    na  50.2     41.9  8.3  na  na  na 
CIC      na 2.3  2.3  0  na na na 
 
Total     1,458*    486.1  402.2 83.9  290.5 27.6* 72.2 
  
*Totals may not add due to rounding  47
July 1, 2000-June 30, 2001 (expenditures) 
        (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   
      (millions  of  dollars) 
Newfoundland    38  16.7  6.8 9.9 8.1 17.9%  119.1% 
PEI      9 1.8  1.8  0 0 20.0  0 
Nova Scotia    63  21.5  21.5  0  20.7    34.1  96.3 
New  Brunswick 51  8.4  0 8.4  0 0 0 
Quebec              437  na  na  na  na  na  na 
Ontario              646  205.9  166.7  39.2  157.5  25.8  94.5 
Manitoba    91  30.7 17.0 13.7 0  18.7 0 
Saskatchewan    90  35.8 29.0 6.8  25.0 32.2 86.2 
Alberta              185  32.1  32.1  0  7.0  17.4  21.8 
British Columbia        256  176.3  176.3  0  97.7  68.9  55.4 
 
Total  Provinces  1429  529.2 451.2 78.0  316.0 31.6  70.0 
 
Yukon      1.7        0.9 0.2 0.7 0.4 11.8  200.0 
Nunavut    3    2.8 2.3 0.5 2.3 76.7  100.0 
NWT      4      2.1 0.8 1.3 1.8 20.0  225.0 
First Nations    na  54.3  50.2     4.1  na  na  na   
CIC      na  3.1 2.3 0.8 na  na  na 
 
Total     1875*  592.4 507.0 85.4  320.5 27.0* 63.2 
     
           *Totals may not add due to rounding 
 
July 1, 2001-June 30, 2002 (estimates) 
 
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    (7)   
 
     (millions  of  dollars) 
 
Newfoundland    na  18.0 7.0  11.0 7.5  na  107.1% 
PEI      na  2.2 2.0 0.2 0  na  0 
Nova  Scotia   na  33.2 20.2 13.0 31.8 na  157.4 
New  Brunswick  na  8.8 0  8.8 0  na  0 
Quebec              na  na  na  na  na  na  na 
Ontario              na  253.8  193.8  60.0  175.0  na  90.3 
Manitoba    na  35.1 12.7 22.4 0  na  0 
Saskatchewan    na  41.0 38.0 3.0  29.0 na  76.3 
Alberta  na  35.2  35.2  0  6.4  na  18.2 
British  Columbia    na  239.3 239.3 0  129.6 na  54.2 
 




Yukon      na  1.1 0.3 0.8 0.5 na  166.7 
Nunavut    na  2.6 2.5 0.1 2.3 na  92.0 
NWT      na  2.2 1.3 0.9 1.8 na  138.5 
First  Nations    na 59.5  53.8  5.7  na na na 
CIC      na  2.8 1.8 1.0 na  na  na 
    
Total     na  734.8 607.9 126.9 383.9 na  63.2 
 
 
The names of the provincial income support programs comprising the NCB 
Initiative, with the 1999-2000, 2000-2001, and 2001-2002 estimates in brackets (in 
millions) are  
1)  Newfoundland and Labrador Child Benefit (6.4/8.1/7.5) 
2)  Nova Scotia Child Benefits (15.3/19.4/30.5) 
WIS Client Supplement (1.0/1.3/1.3/) 
3)  Quebec Family Allowance 
4)  Ontario Child Care  Supplement for Working Families (153.8/157.5/175.0) 
5)  Saskatchewan Child Benefit (17.0/20.0/19.0) 
Saskatchewan Employment Supplement (2.8/5.0/10.0) 
6)  Alberta SFI Shelter Increases (4.6/5.7/5.1) 
Alberta SFI School Allowances increase (0/1.3/1.3) 
7)  BC Earned Income Benefit (66.0/69.8/68.4) 
BC Family Bonus Increase (7.5/10.0/43.0) 
Family Earnings Exemption (11.9/17.9/18.2) 
8)  Yukon Child Benefit (0.3/0.5) 
9)  NWT Child Benefit/Territorial Workers’ Supplement (2.0/1.8/1.8) 
10) Nunavut Child Benefit/Workers’ Supplement (2.0/2.3/2.3) 
 
Source: The National Child Benefits Progress Report: 2001 May 2002.  49
 
Appendix Table 2 
 
Low-Income Rates and Gaps by Type of Family with 1997 Population and 





1.    Reference Case 1:Rules at July 1, 1996 CCTB plus WIS fully indexed to 1999 
(scenario   5 in detailed tables) 
2.  Reference Case 2: Rules at July 1, 1996 not indexed to 1999 (scenario 14 in detailed 
tables) 
3.  Rules at July 1, 1999 CCTB plus NCBS (no recovery of SA and re-investment) 
(scenario 6 in detailed tables) 
4.  Rules at July 1, 1999 CCTB plus NCBS with recovery of SA (no reinvestment) 
(scenario 7 in detailed tables) 
5.  Rules at July 1, 1999- CCTB+NCBS with recovery of SA and cash reinvestment 
programs (scenario 8 in detailed tables) 
 
1 2   3   4   5  
    One Adult with Children 
Families  receiving  federal 552 550   550   550   550 
child benefits (000s) 
Federal  child  benefits    1,804 1,718   2,405   2,409   2,409 
per family (1997 dollars) 
 
Below before-tax LICO 
low  income  rate  (%)    52.4 52.4   50.3   51.2   50.5  
low  income  gap    2,479 2,505   2,192   2,382   2,355  
 
Below after-tax LICO  
low  income  rate  (%)    43.7 44.4   40.9   43.1   42.4  
low  income  gap    1,371 1,393   1,127   1,287   1,270  
Below after-tax LIM 
low  income  rate  (%)    38.3 38.9   31.4   37.2   36.8  
low  income  gap    781 796   571   705   692 
     50
  
Two+ Adults with Children 
Families  receiving  federal  2,611 2,543   2,543   2,543   2,543 
child benefits (000s) 
Federal child benefits  
per  family  (1997  dollars)  1,243 1,132   1,315   1,316   1,316 
 
Below before-tax LICO 
low  income  rate  (%)    12.6 12.7   12.2   12.4   12.2  
low  income  gap    3,834 3,890   3,507   3,676   3,559  
 
Below after-tax LICO 
low  income  rate  (%)   10.3  10.4   9.6   9.9   9.7   
low  income  gap    2,351 2,396   2,083   2,216   2,127  
 
Below after-tax LIM 
low  income  rate  (%)    7.1 7.1   6.3   6.7   6.4  
low  income  gap    1,291 1,314   1,075   1,178   1,130  
 
Note: The gap is expressed in millions of 1997 dollars.  51
Appendix Table 3 
 
Shock-Minus-Control Impacts on Low-Income Rates and Gaps by Type of Family 
with 1997 Population and Tax/Transfer System under 1999 Rules for Child Benefits 
for Economic Families with Children 
 
Scenarios 
1.  Reference Case 1: Rules at July 1, 1996 CCTB plus WIS fully indexed to 1999 
(scenario 5 in detailed tables) 
 
2.  Reference Case 2: Rules at July 1, 1996 not indexed to 1999 (scenario 14 in detailed 
tables) 
 
3.  Rules at July 1, 1999 CCTB plus NCBS (no recovery of SA and re-investment) 
(scenario 6 in detailed tables) 
 
4.  Rules at July 1, 1999 CCTB plus NCBS with recovery of SA (no reinvestment) 
(scenario 7 in detailed tables) 
 
5.  Rules at July 1, 1999- CCTB+NCBS with recovery of SA and cash reinvestment 
programs (scenario 8 in detailed tables) 
 
       3-1   4-1   5-1 
       
       One  Adult  Family  with  Children 
 
Below before-tax LICO 
incidence of low income (percentage points)   -2.1    -1.2    -1.9   
incidence of low income (per cent)      -4.0    -2.3    -3.6 
low income gap (millions of 1997 dollars)    -287    -97    -124 
low  income  gap  (per  cent)     -11.6   -3.9   -5.0 
  
Below after-tax LICO 
incidence of low income(percentage points)    -2.8    -0.6    -1.3   
incidence of low income (per cent)      -6.4    -1.4    -3.0   
low income gap (millions of 1997 dollars)    -244    -84    -101   
low  income  gap  (per  cent)     -17.8   -6.1   -7.4 
  
Below after-tax LIM 
incidence of low income (percentage points)   -6.9    -1.1    -1.5  
incidence of low income (per cent)      -18.0    -2.9    -3.9  
low income gap (millions  of 1997 dollars)    -210    -76    -89   
low income gap  (per cent)        -26.9    -9.7    -11.4 
   52
Two+ Adult Family with Child 
   
       3-1   4-1   5-1 
Below before-tax LICO 
incidence of low income (percentage points)   -0.4    -0.2    -0.4   
incidence of low income (per cent)      -3.2    -1.6    -3.2 
low income gap (millions of 1997 dollars)    -327    -158    -275 
low  income  gap  (per  cent)     -8.5   -4.1   -7.2 
  
Below after-tax LICO 
incidence of low income(percentage points)    -0.7    -0.4    -0.6   
incidence of low income (per cent)      -6.8    -3.9    -5.8   
low income gap (millions of 1997 dollars)    -268    -135    -224   
low  income  gap  (per  cent)     -11.4   -5.7   -9.5 
  
Below after-tax LIM 
incidence of low income (percentage points)   -0.8    -0.4    -0.7  
incidence of low income (per cent)      -11.3    -5.6    -9.9 
 low income gap (millions of 1997 dollars)    -216    -113    -161   
low income gap  (per cent)        -16.7    -8.8    -12.5 
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Appendix Table 4 
 
Low-Income Rates and Gaps by Type of Family with 1997 Population and 




1.  Rules at July 1, 2004- mature CCTB plus indexed 1996 WIS (scenario 10 in detailed 
tables) 
2.  Rules at July 1, 2004- mature CCTB+NCBS without SA recovery and re-investment 
(scenario 11 in detailed tables) 
3.  Rules at July 1, 2004- mature CCTB+NCBS with SA recovery and no re-investment 
(scenario 12 in detailed tables) 
4.  Rules at July 1, 2004- mature CCTB+NCBS with SA recovery and re-investment 
(scenario 13 in detailed tables) 
1    2   3   4   
One Adult with Children 
Below before-tax LICO 
low  income  rate  (%)   52.4    48.7   50.1   49.4   
low  income  gap   2,490    1,981   2,238   2,211   
Below after-tax LICO 
low  income  rate  (%)   44.0    37.0   40.4   40.0   
low income gap    1,378       958    1,166    1,150   
Below after-tax LIM 
low  income  rate  (%)   38.8    28.2   34.9   34.4   
low  income  gap   792    458   618   603   
    Two+ Adults with Children 
Below before-tax LICO 
low  income  rate  (%)   12.6    11.6   11.9   11.7   
low  income  gap   3,874    3,178   3,405   3,311   
Below after-tax LICO 
low  income  rate  (%)   10.3    8.8   9.2   8.9 
low income gap    2,378       1,828    2,001    1,931   
Below after-tax LIM 
low  income  rate  (%)   7.2    5.8   6.3   6.0   
low  income  gap   1,312    930   1,056   1,017   
Note: The gap is expressed in millions of 1997 dollars.  54
Appendix Table 5 
 
Shock-Minus-Control Impacts on Low-Income Rates and Gaps by Type of Family 
with 1997 Population and Tax/Transfer System under 2004 Rules for Child Benefits 




1.  Rules at July 1, 2004- mature CCTB plus indexed 1996 WIS (scenario 10 in 
detailed tables) 
2.   Rules at July 1, 2004- mature CCTB+NCBS (no SA recovery and re-investment 
(scenario 11 in detailed tables) 
3.   Rules at July 1, 2004- mature CCTB+NCBS with SA recovery and no re-
investment (scenario 12 in detailed tables) 
4.   Rules at July 1, 2004- mature CCTB+NCBS with SA recovery and re-investment 
(scenario 13 in detailed tables) 
 
 
     2-1   3-1   4-1 
         
   One Adult Family with Children 
 
Below before-tax LICO 
incidence of low income (percentage points)   -3.7    -2.3    -3.0   
incidence of low income (per cent)      -7.1    -4.4    -5.7 
low income gap (millions of 1997 dollars)    -509    -252    -279 
low  income  gap  (per  cent)     -20.4   -10.1   -11.2 
  
Below after-tax LICO 
incidence of low income(percentage points)    -7.0    -3.6    -4.0   
incidence of low income (per cent)      -15.9    -8.2    -9.1   
low income gap (millions of 1997 dollars)    -420    -212    -228   
low  income  gap  (per  cent)     -30.5   -15.4   -16.5 
  
Below after-tax LIM 
incidence of low income (percentage points)   -10.6    -3.9    -4.4  
incidence of low income (per cent)      -27.3    -10.1    -11.3 
low income gap (millions of 1997 dollars)    -334    -174    -189   
low  income  gap  (per  cent)     -42.2   -22.0   -23.9 
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      Two+ Adult Family with Children 
 
`        2-1   3-1   4-1 
Below before-tax LICO 
incidence of low income (percentage points)   -1.0    -0.7    -0.9   
incidence of low income (per cent)      -7.9    -5.6    -7.1 
low income gap (millions of 1997 dollars)    -696    -469    -563 
low  income  gap  (per  cent)     -18.0   -12.1   -14.5 
  
Below after-tax LICO 
incidence of low income(percentage points)    -1.5    -1.1    -1.4   
incidence of low income (per cent)      -14.6    -10.7    -13.6   
low income gap (millions of 1997 dollars)    -550    -377    -447   
low  income  gap  (per  cent)     -23.1   -15.9   -18.8 
  
Below after-tax LIM 
incidence of low income (percentage points)   -1.4    -0.9    -1.2  
incidence of low income (per cent)      -19.4    -12.5    -16.7 
low income gap (millions of 1997 dollars)    -382    -256    -295   
low income gap  (per cent)        -29.1    -19.5    -22.5 
   56
 
 Appendix Table 6 
 
Low-Income Rates and Gaps with 2004 Population and Tax/Transfer System under 




1.  Rules at July 1, 1996 CCTB plus WIS fully indexed to 1999 (scenario 5 in detailed 
tables) 
2.  Rules at July 1, 1996 not indexed to 1999 (scenario 14 in detailed tables) 
3.  Rules at July 1, 1999 CCTB plus NCBS (no recovery of SA and re-investment) 
(scenario 6 in detailed tables) 
4.  Rules at July 1, 1999 CCTB plus NCBS with recovery of SA (no reinvestment) 
(scenario 7 in detailed tables) 
5.  Rules at July 1, 1999- CCTB+NCBS with recovery of SA and cash reinvestment 
programs (scenario 8 in detailed tables) 
 
 
1 2   3   4   5  
 
Below before-tax LICO 
low  income  rate  (%)    14.6 14.7   14.2   14.5   14.2  
low  income  gap  ($2004)  5,124 5,199   4,596   4,913   4,791 
  
Below after-tax LICO 
low  income  rate  (%)    10.9 11.1   10.0   10.5   10.2 
low Income gap ($2004)  2,893   2,920    2,461    2,693    2,608 
  
Below after-tax LIM 
low  income  rate  (%)    11.4 11.5   10.3   10.8   10.6  
low  income  gap  ($2004)  2,643 2,696   2,196   2,448   2,359  
 
  Note: The gap is expressed in millions of 2004 dollars  57
Appendix Table 7 
 
Shock-Minus-Control Impacts on Low-Income Rates and Gaps with 2004 
Population and Tax/Transfer System under 1999 Rules for Child Benefits for 




1.  Reference Case 1: Rules at July 1, 1996 CCTB plus WIS fully indexed to 1999 
(scenario   5 in detailed tables) 
2.  Reference Case 2: Rules at July 1, 1996 not indexed to 1999 (scenario 14 in detailed 
tables) 
3.  Rules at July 1, 1999 CCTB plus NCBS (no recovery of SA and re-investment) 
(scenario 6 in detailed tables) 
4.  Rules at July 1, 1999 CCTB plus NCBS with recovery of SA (no reinvestment) 
(scenario 7 in detailed tables) 
5.  Rules at July 1, 1999- CCTB+NCBS with recovery of SA and cash reinvestment 
programs (scenario 8 in detailed tables) 
 
 
       3-1   4-1   5-1   5-2
        
Below before-tax LICO 
incidence of low income (percentage points)   -0.4    -0.1    -0.4    -0.5 
incidence  of  low  income  (per  cent)    -2.7   -0.7   -2.7   -3.4 
low income gap (millions of 2004 dollars)    -528    -211    -333    -408 
low  income  gap  (per  cent)     -10.3   -4.1   -6.5   -7.8 
 
Below after-tax LICO 
incidence of low income(percentage points)    -0.9    -0.4    -0.7    -0.9 
incidence  of  low  income  (per  cent)    -8.3   -3.7   -6.4   -8.1 
low income gap (millions of 2004 dollars)    -432    -200    -285    -312 
low  income  gap  (per  cent)     -14.9   -6.9   -9.9   -10.7 
 
Below after-tax LIM 
incidence of low income (percentage points)   -1.1    -0.6    -0.8     -0.9 
incidence  of  low  income  (per  cent)    -9.6   -5.3   -7.0   -7.8   
low income gap (millions  of 2004 dollars)    -447    -195    -284    -337 
low  income  gap    (per  cent)     -16.9   -7.4   -10.7   -12.5 
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Appendix Table 8 
 
Low-Income Rates and Gaps with 2004 Population and Tax/Transfer System under 




1.  Rules at July 1, 2004 mature CCTB plus indexed 1996 WIS (scenario 10 in detailed 
tables) 
 
2.  Rules at July 1, 2004- mature CCTB+NCBS (no SA recovery and re-investment 
(scenario 11 in detailed tables) 
 
3.  Rules at July 1, 2004- mature CCTB+NCBS with SA recovery and no re-investment 
(scenario 12 in detailed tables) 
 
4.  Rules at July 1, 2004- mature CCTB+NCBS with SA recovery and re-investment 
(scenario 13 in detailed tables) 
 
 
1    2   3   4   
 
Below before-tax LICO 
low  income  rate  (%)   14.7    13.4   13.9   13.7   
low  income  gap   5,172    4,125   4,551   4,451 
  
Below after-tax LICO 
low  income  rate  (%)   11.0    8.9   9.7   9.5 
low income gap     2,896       2,132    2,430    2,363 
  
Below after-tax LIM 
low  income  rate  (%)   11.6    9.1   10.1   9.9   
low  income  gap     2,709    1,891   2,214   2,142   
 
  Note: The gap is expressed in millions of 2004 dollars  59
Appendix Table 9 
 
Shock-Minus-Control Impacts on Low-Income Rates and Gaps with 2004 
Population and Tax/Transfer System under 2004 Rules for Child Benefits for 
Economic Families with Children 
 
Scenarios 
   
1.  Reference Case 1: Rules at July 1, 2004 mature CCTB plus indexed 1996 WIS 
(scenario 10 in detailed tables) 
 
2.  Rules at July 1, 2004- mature CCTB+NCBS without SA recovery and re-investment 
(scenario 11 in detailed tables) 
 
3.  Rules at July 1, 2004- mature CCTB+NCBS with SA recovery and no re-investment 
(scenario 12 in detailed tables) 
 
4.  Rules at July 1, 2004- mature CCTB+NCBS with SA recovery and re-investment 
(scenario 13 in detailed tables) 
 
       2-1   3-1   4-1 
       
Below before-tax LICO 
incidence of low income (percentage points)   -1.3    -0.8    -1.0   
incidence of low income (per cent)      -8.8    -5.4    -6.8 
low income gap (millions of 2004 dollars)    -1,047   -621    -721 
low  income  gap  (per  cent)     -20.2   -12.0   -13.9 
  
Below after-tax LICO 
incidence of low income(percentage points)    -2.1    -1.3    -1.5   
incidence of low income (per cent)      -19.1    -11.8    -13.6   
low income gap (millions of 2004 dollars)    -764    -466    -533   
low  income  gap  (per  cent)     -26.4   -16.1   -18.4 
  
Below after-tax LIM 
incidence of low income (percentage points)   -2.5    -1.5    -1.7 
incidence of low income (per cent)      -21.6    -12.9    -14.7  
low income gap (millions  of 2004 dollars)    -818    -495    -567   
low income gap  (per cent)        -30.2    -18.3    -20.9   
  
 
 